The Enduring Conservative Victory in the Culture Wars over American History Education by Haigh, Aidan Geoffrey
THE ENDURING CONSERVATIVE VICTORY IN THE





Presented to the Department of Political Science 
and the Robert D. Clark Honors College 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Bachelor of Arts
Spring 2020
An Abstract of the Thesis of
Aidan Haigh for the degree of Bachelor of Arts
in the Department of Political Science to be taken Spring 2020
Title: The Enduring Conservative Victory in the Culture Wars over American History
Education
Approved: ______Dr. Timothy Williams________
 Primary Thesis Advisor
In the past century, Americans have worked to define their national identity in 
public debates about American history textbooks. My thesis explores how conservatives
have hijacked these debates to promote an uncomplicated, sanitized, and sanctimonious 
vision of American nationalism. I analyze public discussions about American history 
textbooks in each of the three “culture wars” waged over history education in the last 
century. In each instance, progressives advocated that history texts ought to offer more 
diverse narratives and accurately explain the United States’ oppression of black people. 
In response, conservatives repeatedly incited public outrage that these narratives 
undermined American exceptionalism. Their arguments stifled progressives’ efforts. 
Conservatives launched these cultural attacks because diversified textbooks contravened
history texts’ original purpose: to promote a whitewashed narrative of American history
that valorized a racially exclusive national identity. This crusade against textbook 
reform represented an important pillar of the conservative backlash against black 
Americans’ civil rights gains in the twentieth century by sustaining the racial barriers 
placed on American nationalism.
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In this thesis, I analyze discussions in The New York Times about history 
textbooks during the last century’s culture wars. I build upon other scholars’ 
explorations of culture wars throughout American history, but through the lens of public
writing in the Times. In these articles, I explore connections between writers’ criticisms 
of history textbooks and differing ideological views of American nationalism. 
Specifically, I discover a pattern replicated in every culture war: conservative backlash 
in the public discussion against progressives’ efforts to create more inclusive and 
accurate history textbooks. I argue that this pattern evidences a broader effort by 
conservatives in the United States to uphold exceptionalist narratives of American 
history and foster a racially exclusive national identity.
Each instance of conservative backlash in the culture wars followed moments of 
political upheaval in which people of color, and especially black Americans, made 
inroads in staking their rightful claims to American identity through progressive 
reforms to history textbooks. Such moments threaten conservatives’ hold on the 
political and economic power they have amassed through centuries of unparalleled 
oppression and exploitation of black people. Conservatives’ campaigns in the culture 
wars universally sought to suppress this history and uphold false, sanitized myths that 
valorized the American project as a white European invention. In each of the three cases
I explore, these campaigns successfully stifled progressives’ attempts to teach students 
this history and reverse its cruelest effects on America’s marginalized and oppressed 
people. Ultimately, I argue that conservatives’ victories in the culture wars over history 
education represent an important pillar of their concentrated backlash against civil 
rights gains in the twentieth century, and successfully maintained the racial boundaries 
placed on American national identity.
I arrive at this conclusion by analyzing the three distinct culture wars that have 
occurred over history education in America. First, I explore how the political upheaval 
of the Progressive Era gave rise to a culture war in the 1920s, when conservatives 
fought to establish the whitewashed and exceptionalist national myth as the foundation 
of American nationalism in a new national culture. This battle countered progressives’ 
efforts to introduce racially inclusive narratives to American history textbooks and 
established a precedent whereby conservatives wielded their political power to strike 
down progressives’ gains. 
Next, I turn to the 1960s, when the civil rights and new left movements 
identified historicism as a vital tool in changing American society. These groups and 
their progressive allies made important changes to history textbooks across the country 
that reflected the nation’s history of oppression and framed antiracism as an essential 
part of American identity. Again, however, conservatives successfully rolled back these 
changes by halting federal initiatives to introduce multicultural history textbooks and 
portraying federal education aid as a tyrannical infringement of states’ rights. 
Ultimately, I analyze the culture war of the 1980s and 1990s, when progressives 
made their greatest gains: they introduced multicultural history textbooks which 
challenged the notion that race is a biological fact, explained how American prosperity 
is built on racist exploitation, and demonstrated how that history profoundly affects the 
nation in the present. These reforms, however, posed a mortal threat to exceptionalist 
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myths, especially as progressives attempted to institute nationally standardized 
textbooks rewritten in the multicultural tradition. As such, conservatives again launched
a cultural crusade against progressives’ gains, successfully using their political power to
crush this multicultural movement and keep American nationalism grounded in racist 
and exceptionalist myths.
Theory
This thesis is grounded in interdisciplinary theories of nationalism, especially 
those that connect nationalism, narratives, and print. In the modern world, we organize 
by nation. We define people by their nationalities, fight wars for one nation or another, 
and even describe epidemics by their national origin. But nations have not always 
dominated: the nation only arose as a concept in the modern era, following a number of 
monumental shifts in international power. After centuries of European religious wars 
between Catholics and Protestants, during which eight million people died fighting for 
their denomination, envoys from both sides met in Westphalia (now Germany) to 
codify, for the first time, national political boundaries.1 The Peace of Westphalia 
defined each European state’s sovereign boundaries and allowed them to set their own 
religious affiliations.2 
These treaties laid the foundation for the modern nation by placing defined 
territories under sovereign political rule. In his famous book Imagined Communities, 
Benedict Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined political community [that is] 
1 Jason Farr, "Point: The Westphalia Legacy and the Modern Nation-State," International Social Science 
Review 80, no. 3/4 (2005): 156.
2 Ibid.
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imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”3 In other words, Anderson argues, 
the nation is a social construct that arise from political sovereignty in a defined area. 
Before Westphalia, the Church was the locus of political power, leaving borders 
between different religious territories hazy and ever-changing.4 Afterwards, however, 
sovereign states could flourish, and the modern nation in turn.
The modern nation depends on political allegiance from the population within 
its sovereign borders. Indeed, although nations are social constructs, they command 
tremendous loyalty from millions of people. Historian Peter Alter observes that the 
nation “manages to mobilize the political will of a people” using nationalism: “an 
ideology and a political movement which holds the nation and sovereign nation-state to 
be crucial indwelling values.”5 Here, Alter provides a broad definition of nationalism: 
the political culture that fosters allegiance to a nation. But Alter’s definition excludes 
the essential fact that nationalism underpins the nation. As Anderson explains, nations 
depend on nationalism for their existence in the present and survival in the future. 
Nationalism’s political power, Anderson explains, only flourished after three crucial 
historical developments in post-Westphalian Europe.
First, as literacy spread in Europe, most people began using vernacular 
languages rather than the traditional Latin.6 This change built cultural unity within 
European nations and dismantled religious authority in promulgating universal truths. 
Second, sovereign governments usurped religious monarchs as society’s rulers, further 
eroding the Church’s authority under the new national system.7 Finally, people in 
3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 2006), 5-6.
4 Farr, “The Westphalia Legacy,” 157.
5 Peter Alter, Nationalism, tr. Stuart McKinnon-Evans (London, 1994), 4.
6 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 36.
7 Ibid.
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different nations – now speaking different languages under different political leadership
– developed differing ideas about the history of their society and the world.8 These 
changes, Anderson argues, occurred after the invention of “print capitalism,” the system
of mass printing under a capitalist economy. Indeed, in Anderson’s estimation, 
capitalism incentivized publishers to print books in national languages instead of 
regional dialects or arcane Latin to maximize circulation in modern European nations.9 
As a result, those nations’ populations developed common national identities, based on 
a shared language, politics, and history.
Crucially, though, a nation’s history is as imagined as the nation itself. The 
histories that took hold under print capitalism disseminated myths designed to 
legitimize the nation as fundamental and immutable. “Imagined communities,” 
Anderson writes, “conjured up by … print-capitalism always regarded themselves as 
somehow ancient.”10 Anderson further argues that myths of nations’ permanence 
developed as “responses by power-groups threatened with exclusion from, or 
marginalization in, popularly imagined communities.”11 Here, Anderson reveals how 
modern nationalisms include historical myths designed to maintain elites’ power in the 
nation. Historian Lloyd Kramer builds on Anderson’s analysis in “Historical Narratives 
and the Meaning of Nationalism,” writing that “individuals came to identify with public
communities that were vastly larger than the local worlds in which they lived their daily
lives” by “reading the stories of their nations in schools, literature, and newspapers.”12 





12 Lloyd Kramer, "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism," Journal of the History of Ideas 
58, no. 3 (July 1997): 529, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3653913.
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uncontested closure and never finally escapes the political and cultural contexts in 
which all historical narratives are produced.”13 Narratives presented in history 
textbooks play important roles in crafting a nation’s enduring cultural and political 
climate. These stories underpin national identity and are often at the heart of political 
battles over a nation’s future. 
Literature Review
My thesis is a history of ideas about American nationalism encapsulated in 
public discussions about history education. Public education has been compulsory in the
United States for over a century. During this time, history textbooks have played crucial
roles in shaping Americans’ national identities. Public discussion about those narratives 
bring out the political and cultural contexts that give political salience to debates about 
American history education. Throughout the last century, these debates have taken the 
form of “culture wars,” wherein different ideological, economic, and religious groups 
fight for American national identity. My thesis will draw upon a robust literature 
regarding culture wars in America. The phrase “culture war” was first popularized by 
sociologist James Davison Hunter in his 1991 book Culture Wars: The Struggle to 
Define America, in which he argues that modern America faces an impassable and 
increasingly polarized divide between religious fundamentalists and secular 
progressives.14 Hunter identifies culture wars throughout U.S. history, including 
slavery, the Scopes Trial, and the Equal Rights Amendment, in each instance 
identifying how fundamentalists and secularists have battled over American identity. 
13 Ibid, 525.
14 James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America, (New York: Hachette, 1991).
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Hunter’s work proves crucial in my thesis in that it provides the basic progressive-
conservative binary along which I analyze the last century’s culture wars.
Historian Andrew Hartman engages with similar ideas in A War for the Soul of 
America: History of the Culture Wars.15 Hartman focuses his inquiry, however, on one 
period of culture wars in America: the 1980s and 1990s. Hartman echoes Hunter’s 
finding, arguing that “liberal, progressive, and secular Americans” fought “their 
conservative, traditional, and religious counterparts” in a battle for American national 
identity.16 Hartman focuses a chapter on the culture wars over education, affirming that 
“debates about education have long acted as a proxy for arguments about whose values 
will shape the nation’s future.”17  Hartman’s situates his analysis in a broader historical 
timeline of progressive change and reaction in American politics: he frames the culture 
war as a conservative reaction to the sixties’ progressive cultural upheavals.18 Hartman 
concludes that neoconservatives in the Republican Party consolidated control over the 
federal educational apparatus in the 1980s and ‘90s, and used that power to institute 
nationwide standards for public curricula, reversing the 1960s’ secular reforms.19 
However, I disagree with Hartman’s claim that the 20th century’s culture wars began as 
a reaction to progressive gains in the 1960s; instead, I argue these culture wars have 
occurred since the 1920s, when a national mass culture first emerged in America.20 
The existing literature also provides a framework for this thesis’s chronology 
and points of emphasis. Culture wars arise when a historical moment calls into question 






20 Hartman, A War for the Soul of America, 265.
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the basic ideas Americans hold about their nation. Historian Jonathan Zimmerman 
surveys important moments in culture wars over education in his book Whose America?
Culture Wars in the Public Schools.21 Zimmerman identifies moments such as the 
1920s’ mass immigration and the 1960s’ Civil Rights Movements as important shifts in 
the American political demographic that ignited culture wars over education. I make use
of Zimmerman’s chronological distinctions in dividing my analysis into three sections 
about the three culture wars over history education in the twentieth century. Similarly, 
in History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past, historians Gary Nash, 
Charlotte Crabtree and Ross Dunn also assert that culture wars arise as a response to 
expanding American demographics and political representations, and engage a 
fundamental tension between a progressive, inclusive American identity and a 
conservative, exclusionary one.22 Their analysis centers on the planning and drafting 
processes surrounding the National History Standards, when conservatives led by 
Lynne Cheney sought to standardize whitewashed history curricula across the nation. 
The authors played central roles in drafting these Standards, and their detailed accounts 
of the political context is crucial to my discussion of the culture war of the 1980s and 
1990s. 
This thesis also draws from, and contributes to, the broader political science 
literature on conservative backlash in the second half of the twentieth century. Joseph 
Lowndes’ book From the New Deal to the New Right reveals how the modern 
conservative movement arose from Southerners’ repeated efforts to roll back civil rights
21 Jonathan Zimmerman, Whose America? Culture Wars in the Public Schools, (Harvard University Press,
2005).
22 Gary Nash, Charlotte Crabtree and Ross Dunn, History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the 
Past, (New York: Vintage, 2000). 
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gains since the New Deal.23 One of Lowndes’ fundamental assertions aligns elegantly 
with mine: that Southerners drove the political movement behind modern conservatism 
“because they … believed that white supremacy was not merely a southern concern but 
the true ground of American national identity.”24 As my analysis reveals, conservatives 
used culture wars to incite outrage against historically-accurate narratives about race in 
American textbooks and replace them with racist myths about American 
exceptionalism. These culture wars offer a new perspective on the rise of the 
conservative movement, with public discourse at the forefront of the cultural shifts that 
undergird political realignments. My research traces these debates further back than the 
New Deal, locating their roots in the 1920s, when a unified national culture emerged 
after World War I and the rise of mass media. Debates about history textbooks served as
pivotal rhetorical fronts in conservatives’ battles not only to enshrine exceptionalism in 
American identity, but to forge a new political coalition in the Republican Party 
founded explicitly on racial antagonism.
Methods
No publication compares to the New York Times in terms of the quality and 
quantity of public writing it has produced on history education in America. Therefore, 
the bulk of my primary source material comes from this publication. As the nation’s 
premier newspaper of record, the Times offers an ideal barometer of historical public 
opinion in America, which guides my exploration of nationalism in history education. 
Indeed, Times authors’ criticisms of history curricula and textbooks often invoke ideas 
23 Joseph Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern 
Conservatism, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
24 Ibid, 6.
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about America and how it ought to be portrayed to future generations, especially in 
relation to current political events. Letters to the editor serve an especially important 
role in my analysis, because they illuminate the political ideas and nationalist 
sentiments expressed by regular educated citizens. Similarly, the Times’ robust 
scholarly and editorial discussions of current events bring out the broader ideological 
trends at play in each of the culture wars I study. 
Like Hunter and Hartman, I employ the progressive-conservative binary in 
dividing the ideas expressed in the public discussion. While this method reduces a broad
and nuanced spectrum of ideas into two categories, it has remained a consistent feature 
in these because it allows for a clear, chronological analysis of the ideological tug-of-
war inherent to culture wars. I have chosen to marshal evidence specifically from three 
chronological windows, which reflect the scholarly consensus on the most salient 
culture wars in modern America: the first in the 1920s, again in the 1960s, and finally in
the 1980s and 1990s. Across all of these culture wars, I analyze a total of 122 Times 
articles written about history textbooks and their significance in the nation’s broader 
political and cultural discussions. The 1960s’ culture war produced the most discussion 
in the Times than its counterparts. I uncovered 60 relevant articles from that period, 
compared to 37 from the 1980s and 1990s, and 25 articles from the 1920s. These 
statistics are meaningful in that they reflect the intensity and consistency with which the
public discussed history textbooks during each culture war. Beyond that, they point to 
broader trends in how Americans have looked to public writing as the primary arena for
the nation’s cultural discourse. No newspaper matches the Times’ ubiquity and 
reputation within the United States, and its contributors’ discussions of the culture wars 
10
constitute the most accurate available representation of the dominant ideas, beliefs, and 
nationalisms in their respective periods of American history.
.
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Chapter 1: The 1920s
The 1920s played host to America’s first culture war. For the first time, the 
nation was connected from coast to coast by railroads, telephone cables, and most 
importantly, national news media.25 Thus, as the national discussion accompanied a 
national economy and culture, American nationalism became a priceless political 
commodity. For the first time, Americans could ask crucial questions about their 
identity while imagining the entire nation as part of one community. In the 1920s, 
conservatives in the North and South realized they could achieve a lasting victory by 
weaving whitewashed, exceptionalist narratives into American history education. They 
did so by waging a culture war in the reunified United States, in which they fought 
against religious liberalism, racial and ethnic diversity, and the ideological movements 
that threatened their economic supremacy in the North and South. 
These battles came to life in the public discussion over what American students 
ought to learn about their nation’s history. Specifically, discussions about history 
education in the New York Times, America’s first and premier national newspaper of 
record, evidence a battle for American nationalism between Protestant, fundamentalist 
conservatives and liberal progressives. The former group sought to propagate 
exceptionalist, whitewashed narratives of American history across the unified country. 
The latter group, inspired by the Progressive Era’s social reforms, pushed in the other 
direction to teach American students a more accurate and inclusive story of their 
nation’s history.26 Together, these opposite ideological forces animated America’s first 
culture war and foreshadowed the next century of battles for American nationalism. 
25 Zimmerman, Whose America?, 14.
26 Ibid, 15.
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One of the most prominent controversies in the 1920s’ culture wars was 
Prohibition, which reflected growing concerns about the nation’s moral and religious 
deterioration. Indeed, while ushered in by Progressive reformers in an effort to ensure 
scientific progress, evangelical Christians seized upon Prohibition as a critical piece of 
their vision of American nationalism.27 As historian Barry Hankins writes, battles over 
Prohibition really demonstrated religious conservatives’ anxiety, whose 
“communitarian notion that the family was the basic unit of freedom clashed with the 
newer idea of individual rights,” or as we know it, modern liberalism.28 Losing their 
grip on the reins of American nationalism, these fundamentalists, as they called 
themselves, thus turned to history education as the culprit. Historian George Marsden 
describes the fundamentalists as “almost uniformly conservative in politics by the 
1920s,” who demonstrated “unqualified … patriotism” and “expressed alarm not only 
about modernism and evolution, but also about the spread of communism.”29 In every 
case, however, the fundamentalists’ efforts hinged on the belief that “the strength of the 
American Republic was rooted in Christian principles.”30 These fundamentalists formed
the conservative front of the 1920s’ culture war, during which they promoted 
exclusionary and exceptionalist myths in debates about American history education.
Conservatives directed their backlash against a new wave of Progressive Era 
history textbooks which they believed minimized Protestantism’s role in the nation’s 
past. For instance, an Episcopalian minister forced New York’s Superintendent of 
Schools Dr. William O’Shea to ban a textbook written by a prominent Columbia 
27 Barry Hankins, Jesus and Gin: Evangelicalism, the Roaring Twenties and Today's Culture Wars, (New 
York: St. Martin’s, 2010), 23.
28 Ibid.




historian, calling it in the New York Times “a work that amounts to out and out 
propaganda … the Church of England and all the branches of Protestantism are 
persistently criticized.”31 In response to the Reverend’s condemnation, the textbook’s 
author wrote to the newspaper three days later, arguing that the book “has not been 
attacked on historical grounds. Its statements of facts are not in question,” but “it has 
been barred because one man found it offensive.”32 Hayes’ complaint rang true: 
religious conservatives attacked Progressive Era history texts not for their inaccuracy, 
but because the textbooks challenged the Protestants’ exceptionalist vision of American 
nationalism.
In the 1920s, conservatives attacked the liberalization of history education as 
part of a broader culture war to construct an exceptionalist, sanitized American myth. 
After all, the Progressive Era’s history texts rejected the narratives these conservatives 
hoped to preserve: one progressive wrote to the Times that “new social and economic 
conditions” ought to be “reflected in the laws and public opinion concerning the 
teaching of history.”33 But the population’s continued adherence to strict Protestant 
values was a prerequisite for exceptionalist myths’ survival in the United States. In the 
1920s’ culture war, conservatives worked to roll back the increasing diversity in 
American history education by delineating the cultural and religious boundaries of 
American identity. They decried progressives’ reforms as “un-patriotic and pro-
Catholic,” associating Americanness fundamentally with conservative, evangelical 
Protestantism.34
31 “City Schools Bar Prof. Hayes’ History,” The New York Times, May 2, 1930.
32 “Board Will Revise History it Banned,” The New York Times, May 5, 1930.
33 “History in the Schools”, The New York Times, December 5, 1926.
34 “City Schools Bar Prof. Hayes’ History,” The New York Times, May 2, 1930.
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More significantly, conservatives secured an unprecedented victory by forcing 
educational authorities to institute universal standards dictating which history textbooks 
were acceptably patriotic for use in public schools. After the controversy over J. H. 
Hayes’ book, for example, the Superintendent declared that the city would create “an 
approved list of modern history textbooks from which teachers may choose.”35 The 
standardization of history textbooks represented an important victory for conservatives 
in the culture war of the 1920s. In New York, history textbooks earned could not be 
used in public schools if objected to by “any section of the city” for their religious 
bias.36 In effect, this policy gave conservatives total power over which history textbooks
students would read. Progressives concentrated their efforts on including several diverse
views of American history; only conservatives brought objections to these texts, yet 
their complaints were enough to remove the books from use in schools. 
Monumental demographic changes in 1920s America also animated 
conservatives’ efforts to direct the culture war. Most notably, black Americans’ mass 
migration North in search of industrial jobs and greater freedom challenged the Lost 
Cause narrative of the South’s benevolence towards black Americans.37 Therefore, as 
cities welcomed more black Americans, Confederate sympathizers emerged from the 
conservative woodwork to shape history textbooks to their liking. These conservatives 
eschewed equality in favor of rigid racial and economic hierarchies designed to saturate 
power in the hands of wealthy white people. 
Sometimes, popular Southern narratives about the Civil War’s causes entered 
into conservative critiques. After all, despite no longer owning slaves, conservatives 
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Zimmerman, Whose America?, 42.
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sought to maintain their economic power by exploiting black Americans for cheap 
labor. But in the new industrial city of the 1920s, whites and black Americans worked 
together on factory floors and shared walls in tenement buildings. Conservatives 
deployed racist myths about the Civil War to incite racial animosity and paralyze cross-
racial class consciousness before it could emerge. One conservative writer insisted to 
the Times that American students ought to learn that “the South was right, eternally and 
everlastingly right, in fighting for principles upon which our glorious country was 
founded.”38 Another wrote a letter to the editor imploring that Northern schoolchildren 
learn how “Abraham Lincoln … was personally responsible for forcing the war upon 
the South.”39 A Baltimore writer insisted they also learn how “abolitionists … arous[ed]
hatred, intolerance,” and viewed “the Constitution as ‘a covenant with death and a 
league with hell.’”40 In these appeals, conservatives sought to associate both nationalist 
virtue and historical truth with Confederate ideas about race and slavery. They framed 
American nationalism as a prize reserved for whites only, and decried Progressive Era 
policies as perversions of “true” American identity, which rested firmly in racially 
exclusive Southern narratives.
Conservatives in the 1920s also sought to exclude narratives about non-white 
immigrants from American nationalism. In the public discussion, they demanded that 
school history textbooks focus solely on narratives that exclusively credited Anglo-
Americans for the nation’s prosperity. “The alarming fact is that un-American and even 
anti-American history textbooks could find their way into American public schools,” 
38 “Confederates Assert Lincoln Forced War; Call for ‘Fair’ School Histories,” The New York Times, June
22, 1922.
39 Ibid.
40 Matthew P. Andrews, “The Will to Peace: Prohibition and Slavery,” The New York Times, January 3, 
1926.
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argued one conservative Times columnist.41 This writer’s revulsion came from the fact 
recognized in newer history textbooks that “other countries [aside from England] were 
jointly the maternal ancestor” of the United States.42 After all, these texts challenged 
popular narratives that American economic power arose from European colonization 
itself and not the brutal institution of slavery that accompanied it. David Muzzey’s “An 
American History,” one of the earliest national history texts, affirmed specifically that 
“America is the child of Europe.”43 This narrative suited the conservative agenda, as it 
framed the American project as both inherently exceptional and grounded in whiteness.
On the other hand, progressive reformers worked to introduce more honest 
perspectives of America’s early history. New York’s School Superintendent Dr. 
William O’Shea ensured that “the history textbooks have been selected with the end in 
view of giving impartial accounts of the transactions between this country and England 
in former days,” and emphasized the educational value in understanding the British 
perspective of the American Revolution.44 Princeton historians wrote in support of the 
progressives’ efforts: “if we are to profit by experience, [our nation’s] failures and 
weaknesses should be pointed out,” they argued, accusing conservatives’ quest to 
whitewash history as a “calculated [campaign] to impair the integrity of education … in 
public institutions of learning.”45 These progressive historians accurately diagnosed 
conservatives’ assault on history education as an effort to restrict most Americans’ 
ability to learn about and identify with their nation. 
41 “Offending History Books Now Barred,” The New York Times, June 20, 1922.
42 Ibid.
43 David S. Muzzey, An American History, (Boston: Ginn, 1911), 13.
44 “No Hate is Taught in Schools, Says O’Shea,” The New York Times, October 11, 1927.
45 “Princeton Fights History Censorship,” The New York Times, February 13, 1924.
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Despite advocating for textbooks to include immigrants’ stories, white liberal 
reformers largely ignored black Americans’ treatment in history texts. One concerned 
progressive entered the history textbook debate to defend Abraham Lincoln’s legacy, 
labeling him “most essentially a man of peace,” but none argued explicitly for including
black Americans’ experiences in America.46 This silence is unsurprising given the 
broader timeline of the civil rights movement’s ascension into mainstream political 
discourse, which began in the New Deal era.47 In the 1920s’ culture war, then, racial 
liberalism was not yet an organizing principle of progressive politics. While civil rights 
groups like the NAACP were active across the nation, American politics – and by 
association, the public discussion – skewed far to the right.48 The new national culture 
was founded in large part on white supremacist myths, such as those manifest in D.W. 
Griffith’s 1915 film Birth of a Nation: the first ever shown in the White House.49 In this 
climate, the culture war was not fought on explicitly racial grounds. Conservatives’ 
appeals to exceptionalist myths went largely unchallenged, especially when they 
silenced black Americans’ role in the nation’s development. 
Ultimately, conservatives in the 1920s’ culture war tied American nationalism to
whitewashed, exceptionalist historical myths. They ensured that history textbooks 
forged a national myth that tied American nationalism to Protestantism and whiteness. 
Despite progressives’ efforts to complicate exceptionalist historical narratives, religious 
minorities, immigrants, and especially black Americans’ monumental contributions to 
the nation’s economic and cultural achievements fell victim to accusations of un-
46 “Confederates Assert Lincoln Forced War; Call for ‘Fair’ School Histories,” The New York Times, June
22, 1922.
47 Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New Right, 93.
48 Hankins, Jesus and Gin, 2-4.
49 "President to See Movies," Washington Evening Star, February 18, 1915.
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Americanness and treachery. Worse, conservatives achieved a victory that laid the 
scaffolding for the next century of culture wars in America. By forcing government 
officials to set standards for which history textbooks were appropriately patriotic, 
conservatives in the 1920s secured white supremacy’s place in American nationalism 
for decades to come. 
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Chapter 2: The 1960s
In the 1960s, Americans asked essential questions about the core of American 
nationalism. According to Andrew Hartman, “the sixties ushered in an intense new form
of polarization that hinged on the very question of America and its meaning.”50 This 
polarization appeared “new” compared to the 1920s’ culture war because it brought 
about a sudden and monumental reorganization of American politics and culture around
a single issue: race. Civil rights activists in the 1960s brought about a wholesale 
realignment of the American party system, culminating decades of effort by black 
leaders to bring civil rights into the core of the Democratic Party’s national platform.51 
As a result, racial liberalism became the proving ground for American 
nationalism, especially in the public discussion about how students in America should 
learn their nation’s history. Drawing from the Civil Rights Movement, Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s Great Society, and the War on Poverty, progressives sought to broaden 
American history textbooks to include the enduring legacy of slavery. In the twentieth 
century, this legacy took the form of the Jim Crow regime, segregation, and structural 
poverty which black Americans had faced since the nation’s founding. On the other 
hand, conservatives sought to reinforce the racial bounds on American nationalism with
an ideological revolt against the progressives’ efforts. Not only did conservatives decry 
these attempts to diversify history textbooks, they actively sought changes of their own, 
which supplanted coverage of racial oppression with whitewashed narratives that 
supported segregation and Jim Crow. Ultimately, progressives in the 1960s’ culture war
made a monumental push towards racial liberalism in history education, but also 
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sparked a conservative backlash rooted in ahistorical and racist myths that continued 
throughout the twentieth century.
The 1960s’ culture war delivered meaningful blows to past decades’ 
whitewashed patriotic historicism. These blows came from an allied front of progressive
movements that identified historicism, and particularly the historical narratives 
presented in American history textbooks, as a vital tool in the fight to redefine 
American identity. On the one hand, the New Left comprised mostly white college 
students engaged in “the most heartening and exemplary struggle” against racial 
oppression and achieved sweeping reforms in favor of equality.52 On the other, the Civil
Rights Movement, which was born in the New Deal and grew throughout the 1940s and
1950s and found its organizational peak in the 1960s, led to the first federal legislation 
in favor of racial equality since Reconstruction.53 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 broke 
the back of the Jim Crow regime in the South, and the Voting Rights and Fair Housing 
Acts of 1965 and 1968 respectively opened up vast swaths of the nation’s political and 
economic markets from which black Americans had previously been excluded.54 What 
remained, then, was to forge these activists’ legal and cultural achievements into 
cornerstones of American nationalism. 
The culture war of the 1960s began in the schools, where historians and teachers
advocated for new history curricula that reflected the decade’s progressive 
advancements. In Hartman’s words, “cosmopolitan-minded educators believed it their 
job to solidify civil rights gains by making antiracism manifest in the curriculum.”55 
These educators sought to dismantle the racist institutions developed since 
52 Students for a Democratic Society, Port Huron Statement, June 15, 1962.
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Reconstruction; doing so required combating the exceptionalist narratives that gave 
them life. Famous historian C. Vann Woodward, whose The Strange Career of Jim 
Crow was praised by Martin Luther King, Jr. as “the historical bible of the civil rights 
movement,” became an outspoken public advocate for diversifying the narratives 
presented in American history textbooks.56
In the New York Times, Woodward warned of a “civil war over the Civil War” 
in the 1960s, in which “one is expected to choose sides, and history becomes the 
continuation of war by other means.”57 Woodward’s observation encapsulated a 
growing sense of urgency among progressives to address conservatives’ takeover of 
American history textbooks that began in the culture war of the 1920s. Though the 
Union had won the Civil War a century before, Woodward wrote correctly that “the 
Rebels have won the battle of books,” by “denying that there was an illiberal consensus 
of racism in 1860, unlimited by region or party, and defining the Mason and Dixon line 
as the boundary between right and wrong.”58 Woodward’s incisive observations reveal 
how progressives endeavored to recapture American nationalism after conservatives’ 
ideological and cultural dominance in the Jim Crow era. 
Emboldened by surging social and political movements for racial equality, 
progressive reformers in the 1960s worked to purge sanitized and whitewashed 
narratives from American history textbooks. A 1961 report by Times education editor 
Fred M. Hechinger revealed that many public schools in the Northeast continued to use 
history textbooks from the 1930s, which presented “seriously outdated” accounts of 
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American history.59 “Even in the best of the new books the Negro tends to disappear 
entirely … from the end of Reconstruction to the [Brown v. Board of Education] 
decision of 1954,” Hechinger noted.60 In these texts, according to progressive historian 
Fawn Brodie, “the Lost Cause seems no longer lost,” while “slavery [is] taught in many 
textbooks … [as] an ancient practice of small consequence, which would somehow 
have easily evolved into freedom without a war.”61 Lost Cause narratives did not 
feature exclusively in southern curricula, either: as another concerned historian 
discovered, “the majority of history texts” available to American high school students 
“perpetuate the myth that slavery was not the root and the single most important cause 
of the Civil War.”62 Such textbooks, in Brodie’s view, were written to maintain “an 
elaborate legal, constitutional and economic superstructure of argument to justify the 
creation of the Southern nation.”63 In other words, these textbooks served to embed 
racist myths about the Civil War in the lessons American students learn about their 
nation, thus placing white supremacist ideas at the core of American nationalism.
In an effort to extinguish these racist narratives, progressives in the 1960s 
offered more accurate and inclusive accounts of the nation’s past in history textbooks. 
Questions remained, however, as to how “the intolerable neglect of the Negro’s part in 
American history … can be corrected with maximum educational and historical 
gains.”64 Thousands of black students in newly-integrated public schools across New 
York, Chicago, and New Haven walked out of their classes demanding black teachers, 
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courses in black history and culture, and representation in student government.65 Black 
Nationalist groups demanded “a separatist piece of education” devoted specifically to 
the innumerable contributions black Americans made to the nation’s founding and 
growth.66
Crucially, most historians and civil rights activists in the progressive movement 
argued that black history ought to be taught at the center of American history. One 
progressive argued that separate black studies curricula constituted “another form of 
segregation,” because “the history of blacks and whites in America is so intertwined 
that they should not be separated for high-school students.”67 Similarly, a high school 
teacher argued insightfully that “the assertion that the Negro has no history worth 
mentioning basic to the theory that he has no humanity worth defending.”68  The 
teacher’s view mirrored the civil rights consensus: racial reconciliation required that 
black Americans receive the same benefits of citizenship – including representation in 
national historical narratives – as whites.69 
Progressives in the 1960s viewed black Americans’ representation in history 
textbooks as a crucial step towards enshrining racial liberalism in American 
nationalism. “How a person thinks about Negro slavery historically … has immense 
impact on students’ attitudes toward race relations today,” Chicago historian Mark L. 
Krug wrote in the Times.70 In Krug’s view, maintaining a “free democratic society” 
requires that history textbooks recognize and explain “the basic evil of slavery and 
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bondage of men.”71 To this end, many school districts and individual educators moved 
to diversify their history curricula in accordance with progressives’ demands. As one 
reporter noted, schools “have rewritten curriculum guides; built up library collections 
…  and run workshops and inservice courses for teachers of history” designed to 
address deficiencies and inaccuracies in black Americans’ representation.72 These 
reforms came to fruition thanks in part to federal funding from the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, signed by President Johnson in 1965.73 The law allocated 
billions of dollars to education reform, including $100 million earmarked for new 
textbooks and school materials to be distributed by federal agencies to equalize 
educational differences across racial and socioeconomic groups.74 With these funds, 
progressives could distribute new, more accurate history textbooks across the nation: an
effort that spurred broad-based resistance among conservatives who feared the Lost 
Cause’s disappearance from American nationalism.
The 1960s’ culture war over history education became a heated ideological 
battle when conservatives launched a political counterinsurgency against the 
progressives’ textbook reforms. Conservatives’ complaints hinged upon a narrative of 
“government tyranny,” but this time in the educational context. One writer claimed that 
“a federal aid program would be used to enforce racial desegregation of public schools,”
evidently threatening the strict racial order fundamental to maintaining Jim Crow.75 The
best way to “end progressive education,” another conservative explained, was to “fight 
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federal control” by blocking funding for textbooks that explained black Americans’ 
central role in the nation’s history.76 While serving as Vice President, Richard Nixon 
himself argued that “if the federal government gets into the business of subsidizing 
generally throughout the country … inevitably we will move into … potential 
tyranny.”77 By suggesting that federal intervention on behalf of racial equality 
amounted to “tyranny,” Nixon directly invoked a exclusionary vision of American 
identity based on racist myths. Like other conservatives, he sought to portray 
progressives’ efforts to liberalize history education as an attack on the core of American
nationalism. 
In the public discourse over history textbook reform, conservatives in the 1960s 
articulated a version of American nationalism fundamentally incompatible with racial 
liberalism. In a letter to the Times, an Indiana conservative admonished progressives’ 
argument that “the state has an equalizing obligation … based on the false assumption 
that the state can satisfactorily educate all.”78 As such, he argued, government efforts 
directed at liberalizing history curricula “exercise [a] form over tyranny over all … 
[with a] commitment to God-centered or pedagogically different or superior schools.”79 
The author made his statement’s racial implications clear. He described “freedom of 
choice in education” as a constitutional right, thus framing progressives’ efforts at racial
equality as violations of America’s basic national principles.80 This writer’s appeal to 
“freedom of choice” language mirrored other conservatives’ arguments, which used the 
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language of “states’ rights” in defending against progressive reforms.81 “Wherever 
federal aid is given there will be federal control … [and] religious and moral values are 
slighted,” another contributor opined.82 While the author never specified which values 
were slighted, it is more than telling that her letter came in response to an editorial 
advocating federal spending on diversifying history curricula.
While most conservatives saw “states’ rights” as the best defense against 
progressive reforms, others advocated for state intervention to uphold exceptionalist 
myths. Dr. James B. Conant, who served as President of Harvard University from the 
1930s until the 1950s, led the charge to develop nationwide standards for history 
curricula. Though Conant proposed that America “aim for nationwide policies which 
will be hammered out through interstate agreement,” his plan hinged fundamentally on 
expanding Southern states’ political influence in the educational sphere.83 A Times 
column referenced Conant’s plan as an argument against federal education funding: in 
Conant’s words, “a nationwide educational policy cannot evolve unless the states’ 
education authorities are rapidly improved and strengthened.”84 Like other 
conservatives, Conant avoided outrightly tying his advocacy for state funding to the 
language of states’ rights against racial equality. But Southern states’ educational 
infrastructures lagged far behind their Northern counterparts, and Conant’s plan would 
substantially expand Southerners’ influence in crafting history textbooks across the 
nation. 85 More importantly, the scheme presaged the next forty years of conservatives’ 
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efforts to advance an exclusionary version of American nationalism by expanding 
Southern influence in the national education discussion and national politics at large.
In the 1960s’ culture war, conservatives worked to empower Southern state 
governments as arbiters of federal education funding while simultaneously restoring 
exceptionalist narratives in nationally-standardized history textbooks. In the short term, 
delegating funding to individual states gave Southern state authorities disproportionate 
power in restricting the content of national history textbooks, even though almost all 
were written, published, and used in the North.86 In the long term, national 
standardization represented an opportunity for conservatives to permanently install 
racist language in history textbooks. In this sense, victory in the culture wars over 
history textbooks was influential in conservatives’ political counterinsurgency against 
the 1960s’ civil rights and progressive movements. 
This counterinsurgency took the form of Richard Nixon’s victory in the 1968 
presidential election, in which he won Southerners’ support with a platform of civil 
rights rollback. Kevin Phillips, the shrewd analyst behind Nixon’s campaign, spoke 
openly about conservatives’ intentions in recasting the narratives presented in American
history textbooks. “When the average voter steps into the booth he registers the 
prejudice or the allegiance bred by a mix of geography, history and ethnic reaction 
which stems from a past he knows only murkily,” Phillips asserted in an interview with 
the Times.87 If conservatives hoped to continue their electoral dominance in the 
Republican Party, Phillips insisted history textbooks censor “the grievances of the 
colored minorities” and the “exploitation and exclusion practiced against them.”88 
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Instead, he expressed his desire that textbooks warn American students against the 
“alien causes [of] the Negro politicians and Federal interference with local autonomy …
of sharecroppers, Appalachian mountaineers, fishing villages where the catch is getting 
smaller each year, dairy country where the farms are getting fewer, valleys full of 
redundant industries and company cottages.”89 Phillips framed progressives’ efforts to 
liberalize history education as an attack on white people’s economic and political 
opportunities, and by extension, their share of American national identity. 
Phillips’ language became the foundation of the Republican Party’s appeals to a 
conservative majority that persisted throughout the twentieth century and into the 
present.90 Conservatives earlier in the century sought to portray Reconstruction as an 
unjust infringement on Southerners’ freedom; in the 1960s, they framed civil rights 
reforms as tyrannical overreach by an oppressive federal government. These discussions
took on unique salience in the context of history textbooks, as these narratives would set
the terms for future generations’ understanding of American nationalism. After all, 
progressives won the 1960s’ battle in the culture war for history education. By the 
decade’s end, American history texts told a vastly different story than they did at its 
beginning. Whitewashed narratives gave way to realistic depictions of the horrors of 
slavery and Jim Crow, accurate accounts of the Civil War and Reconstruction, and even
the importance of the civil rights and Black Power movements in contemporary 
American politics.91 
However, as conservatives claimed a national majority with the Republican 
Party at the end of the 1960s, they mobilized their new political power to steer history 
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education and American nationalism back South.92 Nixon’s Administration slashed 
federal education funding, handed states and school districts independent budgetary 
control, and redirected public school funds to racially exclusive private schools.93 “If 
the Administration policy is to give new authority to the states and local governments, I 
think we black people are in for a great deal of difficulty,” an official in Washington, 
D.C. remarked.94 “The Republican Administration has given hope of a return to 
plantation days,” echoed a teacher in Jackson, Mississippi, pointing out how public 
schools’ funding had dried up while local authorities redirected money to whites-only 
private schools.95 Across the nation, Nixon’s reforms empowered local governments to 
redirect funds away from public schools and into whites-only private schools.96 As 
early as 1970, public schools’ funding disappeared and more than 5,000 black educators
lost their jobs in the South alone, leaving white teachers and officials exclusive control 
over which narratives of American history students learned.97 
Less than two years into conservatives’ new dominance in American politics, 
progressives’ victories in the 1960s’ culture war were already slipping. In the decades 
that followed, conservatives’ political dominance continued, as did their constant 
rollback of progressives’ efforts to liberalize history education.
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Chapter 3: The 1980s and 1990s
Ronald Reagan launched his campaign for the presidential election of 1980 in in
Philadelphia, Mississippi, where three civil rights volunteers were lynched by a Klan-
led white mob just sixteen years before. In his own words, Reagan’s campaign 
represented “a great national crusade to make America great again” after the 1960s’ 
progressive movements for civil rights and educational reform.98 His promises proved 
wildly popular: he won 44 of 50 states and solidified the political future of a 
conservative majority built on a backlash against progressive and civil rights reforms.99 
Indeed, Reagan’s victory fulfilled Kevin Phillips’ prophecy from more than a decade 
before that an “emerging Republican majority … will dominate American politics,” 
whose “common denominator is hostility to blacks and browns among slipping 
Democrats and abandonment of the Democratic party because of its identification with 
the colored minorities.”100 This “Reagan Revolution” brought about the peak of this 
dominance, when Republicans won five out of seven presidential elections under the 
banner of civil rights rollback and “colorblind” policies which replaced the Jim Crow 
regime with new institutions that replicated its oppression and exploitation of black 
Americans.101 
Conservatives’ dominance also ignited a culture war of unprecedented 
proportions, in which history textbooks once again rose to the forefront of the national 
discussion. This third culture war escalated in the national discussion during the 1980s, 
as progressives’ efforts to build on the 1960s’ reforms were met with defiance by 
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conservatives emboldened by the Reagan Revolution. As one progressive historian 
reflected candidly, “most U.S. history books are very good … the role of black 
Americans is no longer neglected, but the treatment of women, people of Hispanic 
origin, Asians and American Indians is still inadequate.”102 This scholar’s view 
reflected a broader progressive shift away from the 1960s’ focus on civil rights 
antiracism and towards more diverse narratives of “multiculturalism.”103 The 
multicultural view became popular in the 1980s, Hartman writes, because it “allowed 
radical educators … to teach about black identity as distinct from normative white 
American identity,” while also attracting “a wider array of teachers [who] allowed it to 
become the implicit ethos of the national curriculum.”104 In other words, 
multiculturalism promoted a racially inclusive vision of American nationalism that built
on the 1960s’ revisionism.
Included in progressives’ shift to multiculturalism was an increased focus on 
social science principles in history education: across the nation, textbooks began 
stressing the fact that history is, by nature, up for debate. In the Times, progressive 
educators demanded that textbooks recognize “that there are differing interpretations of 
many basic themes in American history,” and that they “ought to … give more weight 
to the country’s diverse ethnic traditions and the sufferings of … minority cultures.”105 
The fundamental problem with the status quo, wrote another teacher, was that “history 
is still generally being taught with a European point of view,” while “the Afro-centric 
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point of view is offered as … a direct challenge to the Euro-centric format.”106 These 
educators’ appeals reflected broader changes in history textbooks across the nation, 
which began reflecting America’s multicultural history.107
These new multicultural texts shared one vital component: realistic descriptions 
of the monumental horrors perpetrated against black Americans and other people of 
color. Students began learning of the “intellectual and educational oppression that has 
characterized the culture and institutions of the United States and European American 
world for centuries.”108 Other textbooks identified and criticized “the requirement, 
common in the past, that [minorities] shed their specific cultural differences in order to 
be considered American.”109 In this language, the multicultural textbooks of the 1990s 
diverged in important ways from their predecessors in the 1960s, which held that 
“recognition of ethnic difference … was politically possible only under the umbrella of 
a muscular national identity.”110 No longer did inclusion in American nationalism 
require people of color to abandon their own identities in favor of dominant Anglo-
American norms. Instead, 1990s progressives worked to teach students how prior 
constructions of American nationalism operated on the fundamental practice of denying
black Americans and other people of color their most basic freedoms. 
Progressives in the 1990s accurately treated America’s history of racial 
oppression as a monumental impediment to equality, not as an aberration to be 
remedied with conciliatory historical narratives. By illuminating oppressed peoples’ 
perspectives in new textbooks, they raised a new racial consciousness among American 
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students. As an Illinois teacher observed in her classroom, textbooks “that include a 
black historical perspective build self-esteem among black students, give both black and
white students a ''true'' understanding of history and help to reduce racial tensions.”111 
In this sense, progressives in the 1990s posed an even greater threat to uncomplicated 
and false versions of American history than their predecessors in the 1960s.
While 1990s reformers accepted the civil rights era argument that black history 
is fundamental to the nation’s history, they rejected the notion that such a history could 
be reduced to the language of “shared contributions.”112 Instead, progressives drew 
attention to how whites barred black people’s own historical narratives, national 
identities, and access to the prosperity they built with their labor. For example, teachers 
in Portland, Oregon, successfully rewrote their district’s curriculum to include “the 
history that the exploiters of Africa want the world to ignore.”113 These educators 
specifically demanded that their textbooks demonstrate how America was built on the 
institution of chattel slavery, and how that institution built America’s economic 
supremacy while stripping black people of their individual and collective identities.114
Evidently, progressives’ campaign to introduce multicultural textbooks in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s represented a unique challenge to conservative hegemony 
over American history textbooks. After all, textbooks that asked students to critically 
evaluate historical truth could hardly do so without introducing alternative, or even 
radical, narratives of America’s past. However, these textbooks also found political 
adherents outside progressive circles, because, in Hartman’s words, these narratives 
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offered a “method for inculcating democratic values in a multicultural society.”115 
Liberals and even moderate conservatives accepted the importance of teaching diverse 
viewpoints to students whose previous history education had covered “only a small part 
of human experience … intrinsically contaminated with racism.”116 This widespread 
political support led publishers to adopt multicultural ideas in new textbooks, thus 
introducing students to more accurate and realistic narratives of American history.117 
Crucially, these narratives profoundly influenced students’ ideas about 
American nationalism. “Our blood, sweat and tears are spread all over this country,” 
one black student explained to the Times.118 She continued, adding that “we’re not 
about to leave now, and we expect to be treated like the first-class citizens we are.”119 
This student’s sentiments reflect how the 1990s’ multicultural history textbooks 
proffered a nationalism that clearly refuted racist and exceptionalist myths.  Unlike their
1960s’ counterparts, these texts went beyond proving that slavery caused the Civil War:
they contradicted the notion that race is an essential biological truth, instead accurately 
portraying racial categories as weapons of control and exploitation.120
As they had in the 1960s and the 1920s before that, conservatives responded to 
progressives’ early victories in the 1990s’ culture war with a concerted campaign to 
reinsert exclusionary and whitewashed narratives into American history textbooks. 
Once again, the conservatives’ campaign started in the public discussion, in which they 
introduced arguments framing progressives’ achievements as attacks on American 
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nationalism. These arguments initially emerged from “traditionalist” historians like 
Arthur J. Schlesinger, who argued in the Times that new textbooks’ “Europhobia” 
would create a “cult of ethnicity” among black Americans and other people of color, 
who threatened to turn America into a “quarrelsome splatter of enclaves.”121 In this 
statement, Schlesinger framed multicultural textbooks and the racial equality they 
promoted as antithetical to American identity.
Similarly, historian Diane Ravitch voiced her support for the conservative 
protest, opining that multicultural textbooks “strive to offend no one while including 
almost everything.”122  True to conservative form, Ravitch dismissed progressives’ 
efforts to accurately reflect people of color’s experiences as trivial attempts to satisfy 
requirements of political correctness. Even in her article’s lede, Ravitch identified 
newly rewritten textbooks the main “cause for concern” in progressives’ wider 
“ignorance or indifference about studying our past.”123 On the contrary, progressives’ 
entire focus in the 1990s was expanding and diversifying the narratives presented in 
history texts. The issue for Ravitch, Schlesinger, and their conservative allies was that 
the new narratives challenged traditional ones rooted in critiques of America’s bloody 
and complicated history. 
To combat multiculturalist progressives and revive exceptionalist myths, 1990s 
conservatives turned to a new strategy: national standardization. These efforts indirectly
followed James Conant’s 1965 proposal to maximize Southern states’ sway in national 
negotiations over American history textbooks’ contents.124 Indeed, 1990s conservatives 
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argued as Conant did that standardizing textbooks would engender greater unity and, 
more importantly, national pride. This patriotism was, as conservative educator Albert 
Shanker explained, the necessary remedy to multicultural textbooks, which “will 
obviously lead to a badly fragmented curriculum,” and “divide our country up like a pie 
among competing groups.”125 Shanker’s statement, published in the Times as an 
advertisement visually masquerading as an editorial, implied that progressives’ 
multicultural narratives sought to strip white people of their entitled share of American 
identity. Ravitch similarly argued that states “have given up on any attempt to agree on 
what their students should learn,” and that some students could only access textbooks 
that inappropriately shortchanged the “white, European history” that she claimed gave 
rise to the American values of freedom and democracy.126 These statements served as a 
thinly-veiled argument that whitewashed, exceptionalist myths ought to guide the 
standard narratives presented American history textbooks.
These public appeals to standardize history education proved popular among 
conservative leaders, who worked to permanently embed exceptionalist myths in the 
standard narrative of American history. Bill Honig, California’s superintendent of 
public education, sought to use his state as an incubator for conservatives’ national push
to standardize history textbooks. Honig launched attacks of his own at progressives and 
multicultural textbooks, which he absurdly labeled “nothing but racism” against 
whites.127 In order to escalate his assault on multicultural texts, and bolster 
conservatives’ broader retaliation in the culture war, Honig enlisted Ravitch to lead in 
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creating history standards for schools in California.128 Following Honig’s directive, 
Ravitch wrote the state’s History-Social Science Framework, which jettisoned the 
multicultural approach in favor of a traditional narrative. Specifically, these standards 
required textbooks to celebrate America’s tradition – described ironically as both 
“unique” and handed down from white Europeans – of allowing people of all 
backgrounds and groups to prosper equally.129 Ravitch’s Framework thus provided a 
clear demonstration of standardization’s power to beat back progressives’ multicultural 
advances and restore white-centered history textbooks.
Given the California experiment’s promise, conservatives used it as a 
springboard to achieve the ultimate goal of national standardization. As with resistance 
to the civil rights movement three decades earlier, rejecting multicultural history 
textbooks became a central plank in the Republican Party’s platform. In fact, Pat 
Buchanan’s opening address at the 1992 Republican National Convention served as a 
conservative manifesto on the importance of controlling America’s historical narratives.
Buchanan warned his audience of “a cultural war … for the soul of America,” in which 
the “Judeo-Christian values and beliefs upon which America was founded” were under 
attack by “radical and liberal … prophets of doom” intent on destroying the United 
States.130 Conservatives’ charge in this fight, Buchanan later said, was to “take back our
cities, and take back our culture, and take back our country” from progressives and their
“cultural allies” in the “LA mob … who never heard of Robert Frost, [but] can recite 
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the lyrics of Ice-T and 2 Live Crew.”131 Here, Buchanan openly asserted that blackness 
and black culture were antithetical to Americanness, as were progressives’ efforts to 
dismantle Lost Cause myths. “Slavery vs. freedom, that’s all it was about, they tell us,” 
Buchanan reminded his audience.132 But “[Confederates] were fighting for the things 
for which men have always fought: family, faith, friends, and country.”133 Finally, 
Buchanan connected his piecemeal observations of progressives’ assault on American 
national identity. “If a country forgets where it came from, how will its people know 
who they are?” Buchanan asked. “The battle over our schools,” he concluded, “is part 
of the war to separate parents from children, one generation from another, and all 
Americans from their heritage.”134 In other words, by contradicting exceptionalist 
myths, encouraging skepticism of “objective standards of right and wrong,” and 
empowering black people to demand basic protections against state-sponsored poverty 
and violence, multicultural history textbooks affronted American national identity.
After Buchanan’s speech, conservatives saw a political mandate to pursue 
national standards in history textbooks which used racist myths as the driving force of 
American history. Buchanan’s vitriol, delivered on one of the nation’s biggest political 
stages, handed conservatives the ideal opportunity to achieve their goal by riding a 
wave of public outrage against multiculturalism.135 As one lawyer opined in the Times, 
standardizing textbooks would allay the “fundamental concerns of the Euro-American 
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majority … about reverse discrimination” represented by multicultural narratives.136 
Another conservative claimed such textbooks were not only anti-American, but entirely 
worthless, as “our American heritage and culture … are superior to other foreign or 
historic cultures.”137 
Building from the example set by Honig and Ravitch in California, Republicans 
embarked on a national offensive led by one of the 1990s’ culture wars’ boldest 
generals: future second lady Lynne Cheney, who chaired the National Endowment for 
the Humanities (NEH) from 1986 until 1993. As Hartman explains, Cheney’s primary 
objective as Chair was to “reposition the traditional American narrative at the center of 
the [national] curriculum.”138 To do so, Cheney’s NEH offered a $1.6 million grant for 
the creation of national history standards which, she and other conservatives hoped, 
would finally end progressives’ attempts to defeat the Lost Cause.
Cheney awarded the NEH grant to a group of scholars at the University of 
California who had conducted detailed studies of history curricula across the nation 
since 1988 as the National Center for History in the Schools (NCHS).139 The NCHS’ 
research, Cheney believed, made it an ideal candidate to write standards that would be 
palatable to both Northern and Southern state representatives. Though the NCHS’ ranks
included historians with diverse perspectives from across the ideological spectrum, 
Hartman writes, “Afrocentrists and conservative Christians, … were deliberately left 
out of the process for fear that their historical visions could never be reconciled.”140 
Indeed, NCHS proposal’s stated mission was to engender a broad consensus that would 
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“avoid the pitfalls of the culture wars,” and create standards grounded strictly in 
academic historiography.141 In 1992, the NCHS began writing the National History 
Standards based on these principles. The project was led by Gary Nash, a progressive 
social historian, and Charlotte Crabtree, an education scholar who co-wrote California’s
Framework four years earlier. Crabtree’s efforts to bring multicultural narratives to the 
state standards fell victim to revisions by her co-author, Diane Ravitch, and the 
conservative political commission led by Bill Honig.142 
However, the process in 1992 was much different. Unlike Ravitch, Schlesinger, 
and the other traditionalists who influenced the California standards, Nash’s scholarship
brings to light marginalized and oppressed peoples’ central role in shaping the nation’s 
history.143 More importantly, these principles translated to the NCHS’ standards-writing
process, which sought to “reflect the nation’s diversity, exemplified by race, ethnicity, 
social status, gender, and religious affiliation.”144 Still, the scholars who wrote the 
Standards believed their work would successfully appease progressive multiculturalists 
and traditionalists alike: each member of the committee was a respected scholar in their 
field, and the standards, in Nash’s words, drew “broad-based and enthusiastic … 
support” from historians and educators across the country. The venerable American 
Historical Association (AHA) and Organization of American Historians (OAH) gave 
the Standards draft their full endorsement; even the American Federation of Teachers 
led by conservative Albert Shanker declared that “these standards simply represent what
a good history education should contain.”145 In short, the Standards constituted the best 
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chance at ending the culture wars over history textbooks since they began in the 1920s 
with a definitive, nationally-standardized, and most importantly, historically accurate 
narrative of American history.
This opportunity was immediately extinguished by Lynne Cheney and her 
conservative allies, because the Standards did not frame exceptionalist myths as the 
standard version of American history. Days before the Standards’ publication in 1994, 
Cheney sealed their political fate with an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal entitled “The 
End of History.”146 Cheney accused the NCHS of “unleash[ing] the forces of political 
correctness” in pursuit of “the revisionist agenda, no longer bothered to conceal their 
great hatred for traditional history.”147 She expressed similar rage at the AHA, which 
she claimed “hijacked standards-setting” by suggesting that older, traditionalist 
narratives placed too much emphasis on Western historical traditions.148 She further 
argued that black and Native American “political groups” were responsible for 
obliterating” traditional history” with their complaints of “omissions and distortions.”149
Cheney directed the bulk of her indignation at the Standards’ emphasis on racial
oppression at the expense of whitewashed myths: Harriet Tubman featured six times, 
the Ku Klux Klan 17 times, while Confederate hero Robert E. Lee received zero 
mentions.150 These statistics, Cheney wrote, meant that “our past will begin to 
disappear from our schools”: this threat had to be avoided at any cost, because “we are a
better people than the National Standards indicate, and our children deserve to know 
it.”151 Given the nature of her complaints, Cheney’s use of “our” and “we” surely did 







not refer to the black and Native American people whose stories were highlighted in the
Standards. Instead, she plainly defined the conservative campaign against the 
Standards as a campaign against multiculturalism and in favor of racist exceptionalism.
Cheney’s article proved a raging success, prompting conservatives across the 
nation to scramble to stop the Standards’ adoption. Academics like Diane Ravitch 
protested that the standards vastly exaggerated “the struggle by the oppressed to wrest 
rights and power from white male Protestants … while greed, racism, and corruption 
appear to be the real commonalities of American history.”152 Worse, conservatives in 
government sprang into action to condemn the Standards: Slate Gorton, a Republican 
from Washington, argued on the Senate floor that they represented “an ideologically 
driven, anti-Western monument to politically correct caricature” intended to “destroy 
our Nation’s mystic chords of memory.”153 Just one Senator, Jim Jeffords of Vermont, 
defended the Standards by correctly pointing out that Cheney’s criticisms were drawn 
“not [from] the standards themselves but … the examples of activities for students in 
each grade.”154 But Jeffords’ logic and accuracy, like the historians’ at NCHS, did 
nothing to stop the conservative fervor. A Senate vote passed 99-1 condemning the 
Standards and advising against the implementation of any draft which did not “show a 
decent respect for the contributions of Western civilization.155 Although, as Hartman 
writes, some Democrats believed the vote would only prompt a reexamination and 
revision of the Standards, the Senate’s denouncement only spelled the Standards’ 
doom.156
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In the end, the 1990s’ culture war ended how its ancestors did in the 1920s and 
the 1960s: with a conservative victory. An ideological crusade from racist conservatives
once again rescued the nation’s exceptionalist myths from progressives’ efforts to refute
them with multicultural and historically accurate narratives in American history 
textbooks. In doing so, conservatives prevented progressives from teaching students 
how the brutal oppression and exploitation faced by black Americans throughout the 
nation’s history explained the injustices and inequalities in the present. Most 
significantly, as their last act in the culture war, conservatives stopped a national effort 
to ensure that every American history textbook included the basic facts of the nation’s 
history that exposed the distortion and bigotry behind exceptionalist myths.
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Conclusion
In 2010, Texas’ state Board of Education introduced new state standards for 
history textbooks. The majority-Republican Board claimed it was “adding balance” to 
the historical narratives students learn, by removing all mentions of a constitutional 
separation of church and state, praising the conservative resurgence of the 1980s, 
blaming addiction, crime, and violence on failures of “personal responsibility,” and 
censoring civil rights and Black Power activists’ achievements in the 1960s.157 The 
national press lit up with the rumblings of another culture war, as progressives rightly 
accused Texas’ Board of “revisionist brainwashing” and “force-feed[ing] children 
conservative dogma.”158  But this culture war never came. Indeed, there is no longer a 
war to fight: conservatives have already won. The culture wars of the 1920s, 1960s, and
1990s ensured that racist and exceptionalist myths will remain essential features of 
American history textbooks and American nationalism. Outraged progressives made 
this fact clear when they erroneously described the ideas presented as representing “a 
small pod of pale ultra-conservatives” in the Deep South.159 After all, though Texas’ 
standards were rife with Lost Cause myths and whitewashed narratives, those ideas 
have long constituted the standard narrative that students in America learn about their 
nation’s history.
In truth, it may be that progressives’ efforts in each of the culture wars hinged 
on an unrealistic optimism about their capacity to reform American nationalism. After 
all, racism, oppression, and exploitation have played central roles in every development 
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in American history, and to stop them in their tracks by raising the nation’s historical 
consciousness is a tremendous task. More than fifty years ago, C. Vann Woodward 
asked an important question: “Is there nothing about the South that is immune from the 
disintegrating effect of nationalism and the pressure for conformity?”160 “There is only 
one thing that I can think of,” Woodward continued: “and that is history.”161 Here, 
Woodward elucidated the central problem in the culture wars: that the horrible realities 
of the nation’s history cast a permanent shadow on its future. 
As America came together as a unified, modern, and supremely powerful nation 
in the twentieth century, it wrestled with its own past: not only the past written in books 
and textbooks, but the version implanted in its citizens’ minds. Ultimately, these battles 
were irreconcilable. Progressives’ unrelenting efforts to reform the narratives written in 
history textbooks met staunch resistance from conservatives who were so deeply 
committed to white supremacist nationalism that they waged enormous political and 
cultural wars to defend it. As Woodward wrote presciently, “the danger in the wholesale
rejection of the South by the modern Southerner bent on reaffirming his Americanism is
the danger of affirming more than he bargains for.”162 His prediction rang true: 
conservatives, politically united by racial animosity, successfully maintained 
whitewashed and exceptionalist myths by making them essential features of American 
identity.
While each progressive voice advocating a new, more inclusive national identity
has identified education as the path to progress, conservatives have decisively won the 
battle to control the education that American students receive. More recent debates over





history standards, such as Texas’ in 2010, only reveal how the conservative campaign to
save exceptionalist myths has poisoned the root of America’s public school system. 
Despite progressives’ noble intentions in reforming history education, their efforts were 
not enough. To excise white supremacy from American nationalism, progressives must 
direct their efforts beyond textbooks and the exceptionalist myths in their pages.
This thesis evidences conservatives’ century-long effort to protect a 
whitewashed, exceptionalist narrative of their nation’s history that subjugated black 
peoples’ voices and experiences. Racist myths played important roles in animating the 
backlash against progressive gains in the twentieth century; including, as this research 
reveals, progressive American history textbooks. These myths permit political rhetoric 
like Nixon’s or Reagan’s, which won massive popular support by portraying civil rights
progress as a dangerous encroachment on white people’s rights. However, 
conservatives’ appeals to Lost Cause myths in public discussions about history 
textbooks represent just one part in the larger political engine that drove the civil rights 
rollback.
The surge of conservatism in national politics occurred in response to black 
Americans’ legal and material gains during the twentieth century. In this sense, it was a 
backlash against the broadening of American identity – and the economic and political 
spoils that identity entails – to include people of color and especially black Americans. 
As Keeanga-Yahmatta Taylor masterfully explains in From #BlackLivesMatter to Black
Liberation, a massive array of policies converged to forge a new regime of racial 
oppression after the end of Jim Crow and segregation.163 Under racist “tough-on-crime” 
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policy initiatives, police departments in American cities have developed military 
arsenals designed to violently control black communities.164 These racist policing 
practices fit into a greater scheme designed to oppress and exploit black Americans 
through the criminal justice system.165 Mandatory sentencing laws operate to target 
black Americans and incarcerate them at disproportionate rates in dangerous, 
overcrowded private prisons.166 
In addition, slashes in social spending and welfare programs have created 
massive wealth inequality that most profoundly affects black Americans, and black 
women in particular.167 These policies all underpinned conservatives’ backlash in the 
twentieth century, which brought about a cultural shift that indicated white supremacy’s
resurgence at the core of American nationalism. As Taylor explains, “the mantras of the
‘culture of poverty’ and ‘personal responsibility’ reemerged as popular explanations for 
Black deprivation.”168 All of these observations point to a much broader conservative 
effort outside of polluting history textbooks with sanitized and exceptionalist myths. 
This backlash constituted a massive political, economic, and cultural effort to maintain 
the oppressive institutions placed on black Americans since the nation’s founding, and 
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